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Studies of the transition process remind us of Stiglitz’s comparison between pathology and the economic 
analysis of institutions (1989): asking what went wrong and what did not is the essence of understanding 
the functioning of social systems.  Thus, carefully conducted empirical studies of the transition process 
itself may yield elucidative results applicable not only to theory but also to institutional policy changes in 
transition. 
This paper presents the key findings of KATO, a comprehensive research project focussing on the 
transition process of agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe.  From 1997 to 2000, the project empiri-
cally examined processes of liberalization and market development, privatization and property rights 
changes, as well as restructuring and path dependencies in three Central and Eastern Europe countries: 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria.  Conclusions on three analytical levels are drawn: (1) the em-
pirical design for analyzing rapidly changing and evolving institutions in transition economies, (2) the 
suitability of different theoretical approaches for understanding transition, and (3) policy recommenda-
tions targeting better governance and an improved institutional framework. 
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1 Introduction 
The analysis of the transition process currently taking place in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) reminds us of Stiglitz's (1989) prominent comparison between Pathology and Economics: find-
ing out what went wrong provides us with a better understanding of the development of living systems.  
Thus, the analytical understanding of transitional institutional change represents a challenging task for the 
relatively young disciplines of the New Institutional Economics and related areas like the New Political 
Economy.  How to empirically approach the varying outcomes of the undertaken institutional reform ex-
periments? How to identify the appropriate theories in order to decompose the complex dynamics of po-
litical and economic reforms and how, at the end of the day, to disentangle complex findings in order to 
give straightforward policy advice?  
These questions characterize the basic idea behind the KATO research project, which explored the 
transition of the agricultural sectors in Poland, Czech Republic and Bulgaria by applying different theo-
retical lenses and empirical instruments on different levels of institutional analysis.  The starting point of 
our research was the hope of finding common patterns of change by comparing the privatization of land 
and assets, firm restructuring, and market liberalization in agriculture.  We expected that the isolation of 
the main determinants of institutional change would be the outcome of comparing theoretical and empiri-
cal studies from the countries.  Today we know that this concept was overambitious.  To undertake such 
comparison first requires a detailed understanding of the political constraints of reform in each country.  
After this task is completed, one may then analyze the results of policy implementation on a comparable 
data set.  But seven years after its beginning, transition was too fresh and too complex a phenomenon to 
allow for straightforward empirical and theoretical analysis on a cross-country, cross-institutional devel-
opment level.  Little literature and the absence of reliable data provoked many discussions and in the end 
demanded field research in order to test and enlarge knowledge and instruments.  This paper draws upon 
the lessons learned from this experience as well as the numerous studies conducted within the KATO-
network.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section one will introduce institutional analysis by discussing Wil-
liamson's "four levels of social analysis" framework.  Using his terminology, we will highlight the special 
features of institutional analysis of the transition process in agriculture and ask how these special features 
can be tackled, both empirically and theoretically.  Sections two and three will try to give answers to 
these questions.  Section two will also, with regard to our empirical studies, discuss the suitability of dif-
ferent empirical designs.  Section three will do the same with regard to theories and the utilized assump-
tions and definitions.  Finally, we will address the role of government in institutional change and summa-
rize our findings in order to draw policy recommendations. 
2  The Analysis of Agricultural Transition - Skipping the ‘Test of Time’ 
The analysis of agricultural transition in CEECs is constrained by the fact that the subjects under investi-
gation do not have long historical records which allow us to reduce the complexity of the research.  This 
phenomenon has been given names like ‘jump start,’ ‘transitional shock,’ ‘institutional vacuum,’ ‘break-
down’ or ‘revolution’ in literature; and they all refer to the problem that current research cannot plausibly 
rely on any time series or constant relations between variables which have passed the ‘test of time’ over 
the years.  Hence, the analysis of institutional change in agricultural transition must take place in a rarely 
explored research environment. For this, the New Institutional Economics Framework is a promising ana-
lytical starting point. 
2.1  A New Institutional Economics Framework for the Analysis of Social Outcomes 
Williamson’s four levels of social analysis (2000: 597) delivers a scheme which distinguishes between 
the different perspectives of social analysis regarding types of institutions, the considered time frame for 
the analysis of change, and a normative criterion for what is to be economized (see Figure 1). 
  1On each level of institutional analysis Williamson proposes different theories, ranging from social 
theory, property rights theory, positive political theory, and transaction cost economics to neoclassical 
and agency theory for the analysis of economic interaction on the level of private ordering and resource 
allocation.  For our purposes, the interesting point of this graph is the time frame and the hypothesized 
links between formal and informal institutions on all levels. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Williamson calls the first level of the analysis ‘social embeddedness’ (L1) which deals with norms, 
values and customs. Usually, institutional economists do not treat informal institutions as variables in 
their analysis since changes in norms and customs are supposed to take much longer than in political 
institutions or organizational structures (Williamson 2000: 596).  The informal institutions at L1 are said 
to be mainly of spontaneous origin, thus – “deliberate choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated 
(Williamson 1998: 27).”  Within the constraints imposed by the embeddedness level (L1), the ‘formal 
rules of the game’ develop (L2).  They may stem from “evolutionary processes but design opportunities 
are also posed (Williamson 2000: 598).”  This opens up the possibility to purposefully economize 
transaction costs by shaping the rules of the game in the right way (first order economizing). 
On the second level, property rights govern the use of resources, and enforcement is entrusted to the 
government with its bureaus.  Even though formal institutions change faster than informal ones, change 
will take decades or even centuries unless massive disruptions take place.  The suggested theoretical 
frame for analyzing institutions and social outcomes at this level is the Positive Political Theory and the 
Theory of Property Rights. 
In the context of Williamson’s critics of the Property Rights Theory, transaction costs come into play: 
“The claim (…) that the legal system will eliminate chaos upon defining and enforcing property rights 
assumes that the definition of enforcement of such rights is easy (costless) (Williamson 2000: 599).”  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) believes it impossible that a legal system can function costlessly and 
frictionlessly.  Consequently, “much of the contract management and dispute settlement action is dealt 
with directly by the parties (Williamson 2000: 599).” 
This allows us to distinguish a third level of social analysis (L3), which in the realm of politics deals 
with organizations as the perfect match between specific sets of transactions and the appropriate choice of 
contractual relations.  Thus, it again offers the opportunity to economize.  Changes at L3 are supposed to 
occur over a period of one to ten years.  Finally, the analysis of the continuous process of resource alloca-
tion on the fourth level (L4) is left to Neoclassical Economics in conjunction with Agency Theory. 
2.2  Categorizing the Problem of Agricultural Transition 
Using this scheme allows us to classify institutional change regarding agricultural transition.  Transition 
in CEECs is to be characterized as a simultaneous and rapid change of institutions at all levels of the soci-
ety.  Starting with L1, the change in ideology and values has probably played a pivotal role in bringing 
about democratization and the demand for decentralized market coordination.  Apparently, not only eco-
nomic objectives but also the pool of mental models (North 1997) shared by the different ethnic groups 
and generations is undergoing a rapid transition towards a place not yet clearly defined.  People experi-
ence and affect the emergence of new norms regarding fairness, the division of responsibilities between 
the individual and the state, the role of competition, national identity, business attitudes, the treatment of 
history and the like. 
Since defining formal rules is usually constrained by these norms and values, an ‘L1–vacuum’ ob-
scures the incentives and objectives of those in charge of designing reforms on L2. Not surprisingly, the 
CEECs struggle with unstable governments that experience problems in reform implementation and a 
lack of credibility in the new rules.  Swinnen (1994, 1996) describes the political economy dilemma of 
choosing and implementing agricultural reform policies in CEECs as balancing the need for ‘doing his-
torical justice’ regarding ethnic conflicts and the need to satisfy the conservative orientation of the rural 
population which often forms a considerable percentage of the electorate.  To some extent, the disappoint-
ing results of agricultural privatization and land reform in many countries demonstrate the problematic 
links between the first two levels of social analysis in Williamson's structure (Swinnen 1994, 1996; Ha-
nisch and Boevsky 1999). 
Aligning governance structures with transactions is what actors are supposed to do on L3.  Producers 
must decide about how to optimally safeguard specific investments, how to protect their intellectual and 
  2physical capital, how to contract for reliable factor quality and supply and the like.  The transitional econ-
omy suffers from poor market development and little organizational experience.  In this situation, 
bounded rationality and asymmetric information are supposed to play a much larger role than established 
market economies (Hobbs, Kerr and Gaisford 1997).  Contracting of labor and land lease, transactions on 
product, service and credit markets all incur interactions which are usually embedded in traditional sys-
tems of property rights and are complemented by the socially accepted customs and norms of the popula-
tion.  Trustworthiness and reputation, both of which are crucial guideposts for contractual man in agricul-
ture, are built on long-term relations and clear expectations on the role of the state in enforcement.  With-
out such a ‘test of time’, choices that occur during economic transition, for instance choosing between 
joining a co-operative, founding a leasing company or family firm, or even between subsistence orienta-
tion, sharecropping and fixed rent arrangements, may be best described as experiments rather than the 
outcome of farsighted economic calculus.   
The fourth level of social analysis refers to the process of allocating resources.  The analysis of rural 
unemployment, wages, and factor prices and the impact on the actors' incentives to produce for the mar-
ket are subjects relevant at L4.  Difficulties occur when price effects should be isolated for various state-
interventions like trade or land restitution policies, the privatization of agricultural assets and the politi-
cally induced reorganization of agricultural farms.  Marginal conditions change with these massive inter-
ventions and with them the incentives for the producers, managers and landlords.  Additionally, the dis-
tributional effects from dividing the enormous cost of transitional changes among actors will impact both 
the way informal institutions emerge, and the elbow room for choosing organizations and policies. 
Although designed for a more general treatment of institutional change, Williamson’s four level 
scheme has proved to be a useful tool for structuring and characterizing the specific case of agricultural 
transition.  As we have seen, not only the different levels but also the understanding of the links and feed-
backs between the levels is of special importance if one wants to analyze the transition process.
1  These 
findings have consequences for the design, the instrumentation and the objectives of empirical and theo-
retical analyses which will be exemplified in the following. 
3  Lessons from the Study of Agricultural Transition 
3.1  The KATO Research Project 
The KATO- project explored various facets of agricultural transition in order to create a comprehensive 
understanding of the process of agricultural transition.  Agricultural transition in three quite different 
countries, Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic was the general subject of our research.  With regard 
to the previously discussed levels, the KATO- project conducted three types of studies: 
1. Analyses which focus on the efficiency analysis of different determinants of resource allocation at L4: 
The growth-effects of applying different reform policies (Pavel 2000), the impact of competition in the 
respective markets on the technical efficiency of different organizational types (Curtiss 2000), the 
efficiency of investment promotion (Czerwinska 2000) and the technical efficiency of farm 
organizations (Kaneva 2000) were the subject of investigation. 
2. Analyses which focused on the explanation of governance structures at L3: Transaction cost 
argumentation was employed in order to explain contracting forms in the hog supply chain (Boger 
2001) and restructuring/downsizing of post-socialist agricultural firms (Brem 2000). 
3. Analyses which focused on the explanation of the process of property rights formation at L2:  For the 
analysis of the process of property rights formation in agricultural land and non-.land assets, 
researchers complemented a set of Public Choice and Transaction Cost Hypotheses with those of the 
Theories of Social Conflict and Collective Action in order to compare the explanatory power of the 
different hypotheses (Hanisch 2001; Milczarek 2001; Schlüter 2001). 
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1   Williamson (2000: 596) remarks that the New Institutional Economics (NIE) often neglects the links between different 
levels of social analysis: “Although in the fullness of time, the system is fully interconnected, I mainly neglect these feed-
backs.  The NIE has been concerned principally with levels 2 and 3.” An international team of researchers from Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria contributed 
to the network.  Although the studies widely differ in terms of their respective research questions, empiri-
cal methodology and the used theoretical concepts, it has proved to be illuminating to assimilate the dif-
ferent study designs into the proposed scheme in order to compare the different kinds of research ques-
tions which the study designs set out to answer (see Figure 2). 
Researchers from the ‘allocation group’ were concerned with measuring the effects of different factors 
on the efficiency of resource allocation (Pavel 2001; Curtis 2001; Kaneva 2001; Johnova 2000; Zillmer 
2001).  These studies provide answers to the questions of how a transition-specific institutional environ-
ment (L2) and different degrees of competition on important agricultural markets affect resource alloca-
tion (L4).  For instance, Pavel (2001) examined the effects of liberalization policies in a dysfunctional 
institutional environment characterized by rent seeking and corruption.  Curtiss (2001) explored the ef-
fects of different market regulations on the technical efficiency of farms while distinguishing between 
size and type of agricultural farms.  Czerwinska (2001) studied the effects of transitional credit support 
programs on the investment behavior of farms in Poland. 
Producers’ marketing behavior within a rapidly emerging institutional setting of quality markets was 
the subject of Boger’s (2001) investigation (L3).  As a member of the ‘governance group’, she analyzed 
causes of contractual choice given quality-segmented markets and still-evolving grading systems using 
TCE.  Brem (2001) analyzed organizational choices in the process of restructuring Czech agriculture.  A 
set of transaction cost hypotheses regarding the speed and the different organizational alternatives in the 
pace of downsizing agricultural collectives were expounded against empirical observations from the re-
gions of North- and South Bohemia (L3). 
Finally, there were three studies dealing with the formation of property rights in land and agricultural 
assets in Bulgaria, Poland and The Czech Republic. The ‘property-rights group’ tried to answer the ques-
tion of what factors in the pace of reforms determine the formulation of property rights at L2, and how 
institutions become socially-accepted rights of action in the process of implementation and individual co-
ordination at L3 and L4, respectively (Hanisch 2001; Milczarek 2001; Schlüter 2001).  The political proc-
ess of choosing between alternative forms of asset privatization and land reform measures were analyzed 
with the help of Public Choice and Positive Political Theory approaches.  The identification of various 
actor constellations on different levels of social analysis allowed to link and analyze the decision-making 
processes responsible for the formation of economic rights of action. 
3.2  The Empirical Analysis of Agricultural Transition  
KATO researchers used different data sources (official national statistics, survey data and qualitative in-
formation gained from case studies) and applied varying empirical approaches.  The next section will 
address three types of empirical problems regarding the availability of data, the application of the survey 
approach, and the conducting of case studies. 
3.2.1  The Data Problem 
Particularly at the beginning of transition, the official statistical information was weak and not very trust-
worthy in the investigated countries.  Complete sets of national statistics were not available.  But this was 
only part of the problem.  Information about the issue of institutional development is poor even in the 
well-kept national statistics of the Western world.  The way out is to either take data available and see 
how far one can get, or collect data by means of surveys and case studies.  Both strategies were employed 
in the KATO project. 
Pavel (2001) and Curtiss (2001) used national statistics and official data sources from Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic, respectively, for their analyses.  The Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE) of 
Pavel is based on a social accounting matrix from 1994.  Curtiss’ data base stems from a governmental 
survey and contains panel data on farm accounts from the years 1996 to 1998.  All other projects decided 
to generate primary data, using different combinations of survey and cases study approaches.  In the year 
1999, the main data set was created by surveys conducted in up to three different regions of each country.  
A two-stage sample-technique was applied.  In the first stage, villages were chosen by stratification; in 
the second stage, agricultural enterprises and households were selected randomly.  By means of standard-
ized questionnaires, information was gathered about the history of the enterprises, their internal organiza-
tion and decision making structures, about production structures and factor use, marketing behavior, par-
  4ticipation in the land, labor and capital markets, financial results and about the managers’ perceptions of 
the future.  The main limitation of such surveying was the difficulty in getting reliable quantitative infor-
mation about the dynamic farm development over the entire transformation period.  For instance, manag-
ers, organizational structures and the production structure of the farms had often changed several times 
within a few years.  Assumptions and estimations had to be made in order to compensate for missing in-
formation.  This afforded the researchers to complete their informational data base with informal expert 
interviews and case studies.  Depending on the types of research questions, different data collection and 
processing instruments were chosen. 
3.2.2  Matching Research Interest with Empirical Instrumentation 
The ‘allocation group’ was mainly interested in the analysis of policy measures and the efficiency of re-
source allocation.  Using national statistics and carrying out quantitative surveys proved to be adequate 
for this research purpose even though the typically processual character of transition and the links be-
tween the different levels of social analysis could not be explicitly recognized in these approaches. 
The ‘governance group’ tried to answer the question of how actors manage transactions within the 
available governance structures.  Boger (2001) specified the observed hog transactions in different gov-
ernance structures using a static and Survey-based approach.  An insightful interpretation of the data col-
lected afforded to add case study experience and qualitative interviews with actors in the hog supply 
chain. 
Brem (2001) tried to explain the speed and direction in which Czech farms restructure posing hypothe-
ses about organizational change.  This required data collection over a longer time period, which could 
only be guaranteed by additional case studies taken from the same regions in which he gathered quantita-
tive data for testing his models. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The ‘property-rights group’ was mainly interested in the process of how formal property rights become 
economic rights of action.  Since the links between the levels and the feedbacks were of major 
importance, information was collected in case studies in which key actors like politicians, advisors, 
researchers, restituents, farm managers and others were interviewed.  Only by picturing a complete 
scenario of formal and informal institutions, could it be explained how privatization laws emerged and 
influenced the levels of governance and resource allocation. 
From the collection and analysis of primary data, we gained the experience that quantitative measures 
could be usefully applied to questions in which certain stages of the transition process shall be explained.  
However, institutional change in the transition process could be addressed solely by means of carefully 
conducted case studies and informal interview techniques.  In particular, the role of history, certain in-
formal institutions, and different actor constellations proved to be of major importance for the process of 
institutional change in transition.  This leads to two kinds of empirical lessons which we address in the 
next section. 
3.2.3  The Complexity Problem – Causes, Effects and Feedbacks  
The first group of studies analyzed the effects of transitional institutional change on resource allocation.  
Thus, the research interest widely followed a uni-dimensional causal chain known from neoclassical 
analysis (see Figure 2).  Questions such as how price liberalization affects growth in a sector which is 
characterized by rent-seeking and corruption were addressed (Pavel 2001).  Others asked how state regu-
lations affect the efficiency of different farm organizations in a transforming agricultural sector (e.g. Cur-
tiss 2001).  By neglecting the interaction between the links, and taking into account the role of informal 
institutions, the empirical analysis can produce results by means of modeling and statistical methods. 
The ‘governance-group’ focussed on causes of the emergence of organizational forms with respect to 
the specific institutional environment.  In Boger’s study, the characteristics of hog transactions in Poland 
as determinants of contractual and marketing channel choice was analyzed in the year 1998, given a cer-
tain institutional environment in which interactions between L2 and L3 were kept exogenous to her 
model.  Nevertheless, the qualitative study, showed that quality-specific investments could not always be 
safeguarded in an inappropriate institutional framework (Boger 2001a).  The combination of a quantita-
tive static approach with a qualitative dynamic approach allowed to concretize statements on institutional 
change. 
  5Moreover, Brem focused on the dynamic perspective by developing transaction cost hypotheses about 
the direction and dynamics of the farm restructuring process in the pace of Czech transition.  Mentioning 
the problem of collecting data about organizational change, he added three case studies to his set of data 
in order to make his model assumptions plausible.  As a result he explicitly emphasized the role of infor-
mal relations between collective farm members as a determinant of organizational change. 
Focusing either on a causes or an effects perspective contributes to the easing of the problems associ-
ated with empirically analyzing institutional change in transitional agriculture.  Following uni-
dimensional causal chains will often allow to get along with information from national statistics and sur-
vey data gathered on a firm or household level.  This methodology is useful for analyzing the effects of 
single policy measures on the level of resource allocation or contractual choice regarding those transac-
tions which can be precisely described in a certain institutional environment.   
However, the intrinsic dynamics of institutional change on all levels of social analysis requires a close 
look at the circular relations between causes and effects and the way they affect new institutional out-
comes.  For that, a qualitative case-study approach targeting the empirical analysis of processes and actor 
constellations is necessary, and was chosen from the ‘property-rights group.’  Hanisch (2001), Milczarek 
(2001) and Schlüter (2001) analyzed the processes of land privatization and property rights development 
within actor and process-oriented case studies including the feedbacks and processes between different 
levels of social analysis, a task which demands intimate knowledge about social relations.  Furthermore, 
the actor-oriented interview approach helped to gain useful insights into the political process of formulat-
ing privatization laws (L1).  Simultaneously, the process of how these reform laws affect actors and turn 
into new economic rights of action on the level of private ordering was analyzed, treating changing poli-
cies as well as the norms and values of the involved actors as endogenous. 
3.3  Theoretical Lessons from Analyzing Agricultural Transition 
Which theoretical lessons can be drawn from the analysis of institutional change in transition?  As men-
tioned previously, Williamson (2000) suggested investigation of the emergence and change of informal 
institutions within a Social Theory Framework; changes at the level of political institutions with ap-
proaches from Positive Political Theory and the Theory of Property Rights; the evolution of contracts and 
organizations with the Transaction Cost Approach; and changes in prices and incentives within Neoclas-
sical Economics and Principal Agent Theory.  It has been shown in the KATO project that the typical 
features of institutional change in agricultural transition may sometimes afford to deviate from this pro-
posal.  The following section will discuss the different project parts with regard to the used theory frame-
work and the strength and weaknesses of these theories in explaining transitional phenomena.  (1) Neo-
classical Economics, (2) Transaction Cost Economics and (3) Property Rights and Public Choice Theory, 
complemented by distributive bargaining hypotheses, will be treated. 
3.3.1  Analyzing Allocative Effects: Neoclassical Economics 
The basic assumption of Neoclassical Economics is profit and utility maximizing behavior of  perfectly 
rational agents in a competitive, frictionless market environment.  As such, one might think that Neoclas-
sical Economics can contribute little to an understanding of transition, because it assumes rather than ex-
plains market developments and behavioral changes (Murell 1991).  However, if we follow Williamson’s 
proposal (2000) and use Neoclassical Economics, among others, to analyze allocative effects of institu-
tional changes in the transition period (L4), it may contribute to a better understanding of institutional 
change as a whole.  For instance, models can be complemented by more realistic assumptions borrowed 
from the New Institutional Economics Framework.  Interpretation of the results of such neoclassical 
analysis may well include arguments known from Transaction Cost or Principal Agent literature.  This 
precisely describes the way in which neoclassical economics was operationalized in the KATO project. 
Pavel (2001) investigated the effects of price liberalization on economic growth in Bulgaria by using a 
dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.  Pavel consequently adapted his model to the 
conditions which characterize the Bulgarian case.  Like in many other transition and developing coun-
tries, rent seeking and corruption is reported to hamper economic growth in Bulgaria.  Before Pavel’s 
study, empirical tests were grounded on cross-country analyses.  Pavel took a different approach.  He 
modeled price liberalization scenarios in Bulgaria in two different institutional environments; one in 
which ‘strong property rights’ avoid market distortions and one in which they do not.  Having modified 
  6his CGE model, the results provided a strong argument for the ‘bad-governance-hampers-growth’ hy-
pothesis.  As long as rent seeking prevailed, standard liberalization policies even had negative impacts on 
economic growth and induced hardly a change in welfare. 
Zillmer (2001) and Czerwinska (2001) applied Neoclassical Household Theory in order to examine 
off-farm employment and investment decisions by rural households in Poland, which is a common 
enough way of modeling these decisions.  However, in order to capture the specific features of transition, 
Zillmer took various market imperfections into account, typical for the Polish rural labor market during 
transition.  This allowed her to quantify how far personal immobility and labor search costs play a role in 
the process of labor allocation in agriculture.  Czerwinska (2001) applied a neoclassical model in order to 
find out how investment support policies affect the behavior of family farms during transition.  Her theo-
retical considerations were supplemented by agency theory and transaction cost reflections regarding the 
market for agricultural credit.  Czerwinska (2001) concludes that in transition, investment promotion pro-
grams can significantly help to overcome deficiencies caused by high transaction costs on transitional 
capital markets.  In the interpretation of the results of her analysis she emphasizes the transaction-cost 
reducing role of investment support programs in the process of Polish agricultural transition. 
Finally, Curtiss (2001) and Kaneva (2001) examined the effects of organizational choice between dif-
ferent farm organizations (family farms, co-operatives, companies) on the technical efficiency of produc-
tion by means of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  These 
methods of efficiency analysis are based on the neoclassical theory of the firm (Coelli 1989).  However, 
neoclassical theory offers no hypotheses about the effects of different organizational forms on technical 
efficiency.  Thus, the theoretical considerations were based on agency theory and intra-firm transaction 
cost comparisons assuming higher technical efficiency of family farms and lower technical efficiency of 
co-operative farms (Schmitt 1993; Allen and Lueck 1998; Beckmann 2000).  However, as Allen and 
Lueck (1998) and others have pointed out, these internal transaction cost advantages heavily depend of 
the production type.  Kaneva (2001) found the average farm in Bulgaria to be rather inefficient regardless 
of the organizational type, with family farms showing only a slightly higher performance than other or-
ganizations.  Compared to Bulgaria, the efficiency level of Czech farms was much higher, as the study of 
Curtiss shows.  In the Czech Republic, family farms turned out to be relatively more efficient only in 
segments with labor and capital intensive productions.  Where production was characterized by relatively 
low labor and capital inputs, producer co-operatives performed better than family or corporate farms. 
In summary, the ‘allocation group’ was able to show the allocative outcomes under the conditions of 
the typical transitional phenomena.  These analyses yield good results by systematically taking into ac-
count market imperfections and transaction costs on markets and within organizations even when using 
static uni-dimensional approaches.  This is true for neoclassical policy analyses as well as for the analysis 
of technical efficiency in firm to firm comparisons. 
3.3.2  Transaction Costs: The Driving Forces of Market Development 
Transaction Cost Economists analyze economic behavior at a different level of the economy than do neo-
classical analysts.  Not the process of matching quantities and prices, but the process of matching specific 
transactions with the respective governance structures or bundles of contracts is subject to the analysis.  In 
order to economize on transaction costs, boundedly rational actors have the choice between exchanging 
goods or services at the market place, within firm hierarchies or in governance structures which are be-
tween both extremes of co-ordination (hybrids).  As such, organization of a transaction at any given point 
of time may be explained as the result of the actor’s search for optimal exchange in the presence of a 
situation-specific pattern of transaction costs. 
This TCE standard approach was applied by Boger (2001a,b) in order to examine the determinants of 
the market organization in the Polish hog supply chain.  The study aimed at identifying and explaining the 
different marketing arrangements by investigating the relationships between asset specific investments, 
contracts, quality, prices, and the marketing channels used for hog transactions.  The empirical analysis of 
the survey data using multivariate techniques (factor and cluster analysis) and multinomial logit models 
could show how the different hog marketing arrangements are organized in markets which undergo a 
segmentation into different quality segments.  We observed marketing arrangements that were not en-
tirely expected from theoretical considerations.  The results above all indicate that quality-based pricing is 
not clearly established on the hog market, instead higher prices tend to coincide with stronger bargaining 
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TCE.  TCE contributes substantially to the understanding of evolving agricultural markets in transition; 
however, one major result discloses that not all of the observed marketing arrangements had been 
expected, because pure TCE was developed for analyzing transactions in a matured, given institutional 
framework.  The institutional setting for obtaining a reward for quality production can be subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty in evolving markets, which may afford further institutional change to avoid the risks 
of contractual hazards.   
Brem (2001) examined the re-organization of state and collective farms in the Czech Republic using a 
transaction cost approach.  In order to explain organizational choice in the pace of the restructuring of 
post socialist agricultural firms, he extended the traditional comparative static approach by drawing trans-
action cost assumptions about the cost of organizational change.  This allowed him to distinguish between 
two different types of transaction costs, the transaction cost of running an existing agricultural firm inher-
ited from the socialist past, and the transaction cost of restructuring and downsizing such a firm.  The 
former cost component depended on an intra-firm measurement problem (e.g. labor), while the latter 
component depended on asset specificity problems in downsizing.  An explanation for the process of 
downsizing and restructuring in the agricultural sector of the Czech Republic evolves from drawing mod-
els which consequently incorporate his assumptions.  As a result, Brem shows how the history of the farm 
affects the choice of the governance structure in the pace of restructuring.  In the cost-benefit calculus 
between keeping highly specific assets in the existing organization of production or re-deploying them in 
other forms of organization, the high transaction cost of change often leads to an avoidance of restructur-
ing. 
The lesson to be learned from the theoretical analysis is that in cases where contractual choice, with 
regard to clearly defined transactions with few institutional alternatives and foreseeable pay-offs is con-
cerned (Boger 2001a,b), it seems plausible to abstract from the influence of other levels of institutional 
development in order to explain phenomena like organizational or contract choice in agricultural transi-
tion.  Results explain the state of the art in the development of governance structures at a certain stage of 
market evolution, and help to identify the requirements for further development.  The use of the TCE for 
the analysis of a dynamic process, as is the case of Brem’s analysis of the Czech restructuring process, is 
a challenging step into a new area of transaction cost analysis.  The dynamic perspective of TCE is still 
underdeveloped.  Both studies conclude that using basic theoretical tools definitely supports the 
development of a structured framework for the analysis; however, the evolutionary character of transition 
processes requires further specification of models and instrumentation. 
3.3.3  The Theory of Agricultural Property Rights  
The ‘property-rights group’ dealt with the analysis of agricultural property reforms in Bulgaria (Hanisch 
2001), the Czech Republic (Schlüter 2001), and Poland (Milczarek 2001).  The theoretical basis for the 
analysis and the way it was extended was similar in the three studies.  The aim was clearly positive and 
directed towards extending and improving the theoretical understanding of agricultural property reform.    
A Theory Puzzle 
The economics of legal relationships are a prominent area of research resulting from the liaison between 
law and economics in the early 1960's.  The cornerstone of this research area may be characterized by the 
question of how rights re-emerge and come to command respect (Buchannan 1975: 77).  Neoclassical 
analysis treats the political process exogenously and does not tackle the relation between the allocation of 
rights and the allocation of resources (Pejovich 1975: 38).  Demsetz (1967: 347-359) showed that the de-
velopment of property rights in land among American Indians was endogenously determined; that is, it 
took place in response to the desire of the interacting persons for more utility.  He concluded that where 
externalities in exchange are unavoidable, property rights must be defined and enforced in order to inter-
nalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization (Dem-
setz 1967: 360).  This "naive" view of the process of property rights creation (Eggertson 1990: 23) was 
criticized because it does not allow for the acknowledgement of inefficient social outcomes (Olson 2000: 
58), and because it reduces the role of the state solely to the arbitration of private disputes (Williamson 
2000: 598).  Libecap (1993: 31) proposes to extend the Theory of Property Rights with a positive analysis 
of the political process. 
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(1965) are theoretical elements which allow for a rational choice analysis of the political process.  Au-
thors like Dixit (1996: 125) or Williamson (2000: 601-602) translated TCE into politics: at first sight inef-
ficient political outcomes must be reassessed with regard to the transaction cost constraints in the political 
process.  Unless a better policy can be identified and implemented, the one in place is to be called effi-
cient.  North (1990) is skeptical about the general belief in the efficiency of the political process.  He pos-
its that institutions can only serve efficiently if they arise in a market-like environment.  He stresses the 
role of learning processes for the evolution of institutions.  In situations in which competition is not in 
place, learning will take much longer and the continuos process of re-bargaining for property rights will 
often not yield efficient results (North 1990: 95).   
This is the starting point of Knight’s Theory of Social Conflict (1992).  He describes property rights as 
the outcome of distributive conflict between self-interested individuals with often asymmetric resource 
endowments and bargaining strength.  His focus lies on the emergence and change of informal rules like 
ideologies and customs because he is convinced that it is the informal rules and values which form the 
basis for social acceptance, and thereby legitimization of economic rights.  As a consequence, in such 
explanations, efficient outcomes are the exception rather than the rule in the process of property rights 
formation.   
Putting the pieces together 
Figure 3 delivers an actor-centered ‘model of thought’ depicting the process of property rights formation 
within the pace of transition.  The illustration shows a rational choice model which focuses on the analy-
sis of The Choices and Actors in Charge between individual and political decisions.  To the left of each 
actor there is the Pool of Alternatives to consider while analyzing decisions.  Results from choices on the 
political level (A1) turn into restrictions (slashed arrows) on the choice of alternatives on the subsequent 
levels of decision making, as appears on the level of reform implementation (A2) and the level of private 
ordering (A3).  Here governance structures arise and the perceived income distribution feeds back to the 
constellation of political actors (policy cycle).  The slashed arrows point in two directions.  This means 
that decisions on a higher level are constrained by the respective political and implementational costs 
which consequently arise and which allocate a price to each political and administrative decision.  This 
political economy model allows us to position different theoretical lenses regarding the mechanisms of 
institutions.  The advantage of linking hypotheses from different theories is that it allows to consider dif-
ferent mechanisms of institutional change in one and the same process, thus the links between different 
levels of social interplay and its dynamics can be the subject of hypothesizing.   
A1: Political decisions regarding land reform policy and the privatization of agricultural assets are ex-
plained in the context of the political influence of the rural electorate, and the specific features of the dis-
cussed choice alternatives (reform packages).  Public Choice hypotheses about the actors` objectives con-
centrate on the aspect of defending political power, or following certain party ideologies (Swinnen 1997).  
The efficiency of reform policy has to be judged with respect to ‘The Pool of Alternatives’ and the cost of 
carrying through and implementing them.   
A2: Bureaucratic decisions regarding the interpretation of formal rights and reform policy must be ex-
plained in light of the cost of reform implementation and the related principal agent problems between 
government and administration.  Constraints on the elbow room of actors arise from what is budgeted or 
written down as laws, and from the available instruments to control bureaucrats in business.  Transaction 
Cost and Principal Agent hypotheses concentrate on the objectives and elbow room of certain actors, the 
incentives to carry out or boycott implementation, or those who extract money through corruption.A3: 
Property Reform asks local actors to decide on two general questions: first, what to do with formal land 
rights? Second, what to do with vouchers or physical assets? Thus, new formal property rights need to be 
exchanged to become rights of action (Barzel 1989: 2).  Decisions, be it a single contract on land rent or 
the buildup of whole agricultural firms, make up part of the process of forming new property rights.  In-
come is generated, distributed and protected in this process and the value of each actors' share of income 
from exchange and coordination gives notice about the nature of the involved property right.  Different 
assumptions about the nature of exchange have been posed, and will be explored below  
Efficiency: Transaction Cost Theory stimulates the Theory of the Agricultural Contract and the Theory 
of Property Rights (Cheung 1969; Hayami and Otsuka 1993): Governance structures are supposed to be 
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efficient result with regard to the specific transaction cost involved in each specific problem of agricul-
tural exchange.  In transition the following mechanism may be assumed: as soon as an initial structure of 
formal property rights gets enacted, rational actors bargain with each other and leave no money on the 
table until a mutually advantageous definition of effective rights to assets and land will be found.  The 
efficiency of social outcomes must be assessed with special emphasis on the attributes of agricultural 
goods, inputs and services, and the institutional environment in place.  An explanation for, at first glance, 
inefficient outcomes of transitional contracting may arise from the identification of transaction cost con-
straints on the actors.  In transition, typical outcomes like sharecropping, producer co-operatives, subsis-
tence farming, and regional monopolies may be explained as rational actors` responses to the malfunc-
tioning of credit, risk, or manager markets, or to the specificity of agricultural assets.   
Distributional Conflict: Institutional economists do not usually question the concept of efficiency as 
the backbone of the explanation of social outcomes.  However, traditionally there is another strand of 
argumentation which is based on a model of social interaction which allows for actor differences to play a 
role in shaping outcomes (Knight 1992).  Agricultural property reform often creates an exchange situation 
which is constrained by considerable transaction costs and by which formal rights to resources are dis-
tributed.  In such a situation, the Distributive Bargaining Theory assumes that in the bargaining for eco-
nomic rights, (1) market competition or rivalry between actors might not suffice to even out differentials 
in bargaining strength, (2) actors with different endowments of bargaining-relevant resources face dis-
tributive conflicts and seek strategic advantage (Schelling 1960: 18).   
The processes of initial issuing of formal rights down to the moment of collective acceptance of new eco-
nomic rights of action involve informal rules like ideology, reputation and leadership to organize collec-
tive action.  Therefore, in rural societies, action rights may reflect rural authority relations, manipulation 
via asymmetric information, non-decision making, temporal vulnerability of producers, the threat of re-
taliation, or even naked force.  The exchange of new agricultural property may be characterized by little 
competition and distributive conflicts about key resources.  Actors may be distinguishable in terms of the 
resources they can put into play. 
In transition, typical outcomes like sharecropping, producer co-operatives, subsistence farming, and 
regional monopolies may be explained as protectionist efforts of otherwise vulnerable actors, the success-
ful capture attempts of single actors; or by some actor constellations holding key attributes for agricultural 
production or marketing. 
Towards a comprehensive understanding of agricultural property reform in transition 
A common result of the studies is that the formal property rights which were formulated to start the re-
form process had little more to offer than to give some orientation for the bureaucratic process of asset 
privatization and land titling.  As a matter of fact, the laws and regulations designed to institute agricul-
tural transition did little else but pass on to rural actors the immense transaction costs associated with de-
fining and protecting these new rights.  The political conflict over land reform and asset privatization laws 
was strongest in Bulgaria, where each time the government changed hands, reform policies were altered 
(Hanisch and Boevsky 1999).  However, in all of the countries the provisions of reform laws had little to 
do with day-to-day practices in the villages.  Schlüter (2001) found that while the Czech agricultural pri-
vatization scheme formally benefited restituents, former agricultural managers clearly benefited from 
controlling the privatization process in the villages.  Hanisch (2001) and Milczarek (2001) made similar 
observations in Bulgaria and Poland.  In Bulgaria, Hanisch observed that those intending to found a fam-
ily farm had practically no access to privatized machines, even in cases in which they had bought consid-
erable amounts of shares.  His empirical results show that those voucher holders who did not intend to 
join a co-operative were systematically discriminated against in the privatization process.  This discrimi-
nation was underpinned with ideological reasoning stimulated by the lobbying activities of rural leaders 
like managers and village mayors.  Going private equaled "stealing from the co-operative" and was not 
socially acceptable at that time.   
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Those and other examples from the country studies indicate the importance of analyzing property re-
form in transition as a process.  A distinction must be drawn between formal and effective property rights 
in order to capture the dynamics and links between politics, implementation and private orderings, and the 
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2.  Regarding the analysis of transactions in situations where formal laws are 
obscured and subject to interpretation, efficiency and transaction cost hypotheses are often not enough to 
create a comprehensive understanding for the evolution of rights.  In the case studies, the effect of certain 
actor constellations on the level of private ordering, ideology, and the efficacy of competition on input 
markets as a means for providing choice alternatives proved to be of major importance for explaining 
decisions regarding governance, land and asset allocation, and the nature of the involved economic rights 
of action.  Social acceptance as a precondition for the institutionalization of rights demands special ana-
lytical emphasis for the role of collective action and the position of rural leaders. 
3.4  Policy Lessons from Analyzing Agricultural Transition 
The fundamental problem in giving policy advice is that as soon as economists propose measures which 
put costs on economic actors, politicians will have to label ‘efficiency’ and ‘growth’ with the names of 
those to pay for these achievements.  One way out is to assume away distributive effects and how they 
may hamper policy design and implementation.  In this case, the political process remains exogenous and 
efficiency or economic growth are ‘objective’ criteria for ranking different policies.  The other option is 
to resort to the positive analysis of the determinants of political and economic decision making.  This op-
tion perceives the political process as endogenous in the analysis and as a consequence, normative state-
ments about how to get the institutions, the governance structures, or the marginal conditions ‘right’ are 
much more difficult to make. 
KATO studies can be categorized into the previously described continuum between studies which give 
straightforward policy advice on the basis of efficiency or growth criteria, and studies which investigated 
the political economy of agricultural reforms without normative research interest.  Both the ‘allocation 
group’ and the ‘governance group’ take policies as exogenous and identify institutional impediments for 
improving allocation efficiency or for lowering transaction costs.  Hence, policy recommendations turn 
the observed relations between model variables into "target-instrument"-functions, implicitly assuming 
that politicians are able to control the respective instruments. This allocates a strong role to government in 
institutional change and implicitly assumes a "helping hand" model of the state (Shleifer and Vishny 
1998: 17). For instance in Bulgaria, rent seeking is observed to be a major impediment of agricultural 
growth.  Hence, Pavel’s recommendations focus on the alleviation of rent-seeking and corruption incen-
tives in the agrifood chain and the respective bureaucracy (2001).  By modeling different policy scenar-
ios, he concludes that Bulgaria requires a deeper reform than just canceling tax and tariff distortion a in 
order to increase welfare and efficiency.  Policies should rather focus on anti-corruption measures, the 
establishment of NGOs for enhancing social capital and the strengthening of legal enforcement. 
Poland’s economy, much more advanced in this respect, also lacks some of the necessary institutions 
to make markets work.  The example of the Polish hog market shows that lack of a standardized grading 
systems creates high uncertainty regarding the judgement of product quality (Boger 2001b).  Hence, the 
role of the state in supporting market development must be redefined towards a more active involvement 
in the mechanism of markets. If private governance fails to provide security for specific investments and 
contractual arrangements, public govenance through regulation may be a more efficient solution to 
protect property rights.  For the Polish hog market, the obligatory introduction and monitoring of 
standardised grading systems, conceivably combined with structural support for their implementation, 
may reduce transaction costs and increase the sector’s welfare more effectively than using price regula-
tion in order to avoid the adverse effects of transition.As Czerwinska showed with her example of the 
effects of the capital market constrains on the investment behavior of Polish farmers, state intervention in 
the capital market through investment promotion schemes proved to be an adequate tool in cases where 
transaction costs on capital markets impede investment (Czerwinska 2001). 
The ‘property-rights group’ regarded policy as endogenous.  Expectably no policy advice is extracted 
from the works of Schlüter (2001) and Milczarek (2001).  Hanisch (2001) argues with Eggertson (1997: 
71-72) who claims that decision makers on all levels of institutional change in transition suffer from in-
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2   Barzel draws a clear distinction between legal rights and economic rights. “Legal rights as a rule enhance economic rights, 
but the former are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the latter.” Each actor’s possibilities for rights pro-
tection, other people’s capture attempts and government’s efforts towards the protection of individual property rights have 
to be taken into consideration (Barzel 1989: 2). complete information and incomplete models of how the politico-economic system works.  This gives 
room for improving decision makers information and models by means of process-oriented positive 
analyses.  Hanisch’s advice is directed towards different actor groups and aims at improving the under-
standing of the property reform process.  Pointing at machine distribution to be the key conflict of prop-
erty reform in Bulgaria, he claims that if policy makers intend to strengthen individual property rights in 
agricultural land they must avoid asset privatization and credit programs which solely favor large scale 
farms.  In this context he repeatedly explicates the role of social acceptance (fairness) for the evolution of 
property rights.  Those politicians in Bulgaria who do not favor strong property rights in land and assets 
must understand the spreading of subsistence orientation as the, often, only means to protect the relatively 
small rents from new agricultural ownership against stronger actors’ capture attempts.  The fact that Bul-
garian politicians often treat the massive development of the subsistence sector in Bulgarian agriculture 
solely as a problem of missing land consolidation policy is, in the eyes of Hanisch, a misconception and 
delivers some evidence for the previously hypothesized need to improve decision makers` mental models.  
Being rather skeptical about the incentives and capabilities of the political actors in Bulgaria, he proposes 
that those who have an incentive to improve the situation in the agricultural sector avoid strong political 
measures and instead advocate and support self-help initiatives like, for example, rural credit unions and 
water and service co-operatives. This kind of advice allocates a relatively weak role to government in 
institutional change and considers that political action may be constrained by political instability and con-
flict. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper discussed the design and the findings of different studies of the KATO research network along 
the lines of an NIE Framework.  The variety of research conceptions allowed us to explore the strengths 
and weaknesses of each study's design for answering questions on different levels of the analysis of insti-
tutional change in agricultural transition.  Implications were discussed under three headings.  (1) The em-
pirical design for analyzing rapidly changing and evolving institutions in transition economies; (2) the 
suitability of different theoretical approaches to penetrate the transition process, and (3) policy recom-
mendations targeting better governance and an improved institutional framework.  
The empirical analysis of institutional reform often afforded the application of a mixture of data 
collection instruments.  Extensive surveying of the problem to be investigated proved often to be the only 
way of testing NIE hypotheses in transition processes.  Nevertheless, quantitative data, either collected 
primarily or used from national statistical offices, only allowed to test hypotheses about causes and ef-
fects of institutional choice at a certain moment of agricultural reform.  Such kind of data was of little 
help for assessing the role of actor constellations, historical structures and informal institutions in a dy-
namic perspective.  Because many of the observed institutions were subject to political debate and fre-
quent changes, those interested in the dynamics and interrelations in institutional change had to broaden 
their views with case studies and qualitative interviews.  The political economy process of agricultural 
property reform was only possible with case studies at a community or village level in combination with 
interviews with political actors.  This experience underlines Alston’s findings (1996: 30) that “with the 
present state of theoretical knowledge about institutions, the case study approach is often the only way to 
further our knowledge about institutional change.”  A general lesson from the project is that the develop-
ment of analytical concepts for transition problems ideally categorize data needs in advance and combine 
innovatively quantitative and qualitative empirical methods in order to gain promising results. 
For an assessment of the theoretical tools for the analysis of agricultural transition it proved to be very 
useful to discuss the categories proposed in Williamson’s four level scheme.  Allocation, governance and 
the political economy of agricultural reform are very different perspectives of institutional change which 
afforded the application of different theoretical approaches.  Our paper discussed the suitability of differ-
ent approaches with regard to analytical levels and the time frame of the analysis.  Neoclassical models 
were suitable to investigate effects of institutional change on resource allocation.  Theoretical elements 
from the NIE can contribute in two ways to the adaptation of neoclassical models to the special conditions 
of transition: first, model assumptions may reflect market imperfections due to transaction cost con-
straints and asymmetric information.  Second, NIE argumentation may contribute to the interpretation of 
the results from neoclassical modeling. 
  12TCE delivers a bundle of refutable hypotheses about market development and institutional choice. 
Analyses about the status quo in market development and about the determinants of structural change 
yielded rich insights into the process of agricultural transition.  However, the studies showed that the con-
cept is suitable for analyzing the static, rather than the dynamic, dimension of agricultural transition.  
Transaction cost predictions about the adaptation of organizations still lack precision and may be the sub-
ject of further elaboration of the NIE.  
The Positive Theory of Property Reform still represents a puzzle of different approaches.  For the 
analysis of agricultural property reform it was useful to develop a comprehensive model of choices, actors 
and opportunities in order to combine different hypotheses on different levels of social analysis.  Such a 
concept has its clear empirical limitations.  However, in order to extend the Theory of Property Rights, it 
seems to be of importance to make room for more accurate hypotheses about distributive conflicts and 
informal relations among actors in the process of property rights formation.   
The objective "To analyze institutional change in transition," to some extent conflicts with the objec-
tive to give policy advice.  While an exogenous treatment of political institutions typically ignores the 
constraints of agricultural reformers, a fully endogenous treatment may reveal that the portfolio of 
alternative policy choices approaches an empty set (Eggertsson 1997: 71).”  NIE’s insights are in most 
cases still too general for guiding transitional policy (Smyth 1998: 361).  An important facet in this 
context seems to be the search for better criteria to allow for ranking different policy alternatives.  A good 
illustration of how far away the NIE still is from guiding transitional policy is given in the following 
statement from Williamson:  
"What I have referred to as the remediableness criterion is intended to rectify this asymmetric state of affairs.  This cri-
terion (remediableness) holds that an extant mode of organization (government included) for which no superior feasible 
alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed efficient (...) Finally, grounds for re-
butting the efficiency presumption need to be addressed-which brings in politics.  Absent rebuttal, the remediableness 
criterion stands as a reminder of the obvious: it is impossible to do better than one´s best" (Williamson 2000: 601-602)."  
This statement clearly overstrains the capabilities of most research concepts, since it demands a complete 
ex-ante and ex-post assessment of all possible institutional alternatives with their respective political and 
implementation costs before changes can be proposed.  Thus, a more practical agenda for offering good 
advice based on an NIE framework is a pressing need for further research.  The KATO project, as an in-
terdisciplinary research network that above all targeted the extension of theories towards more compre-
hensive models, was only a first step in a new promising area of future research. 
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Figure 1  Four Levels of Social Analysis 
L1: Social Theory 
L2: Economics of Property Rights, Positive Political Theory  
L3: Transaction Cost Economics 
L4: Neoclassical Economics/Agency Theory 
Source: adapted from Williamson (2000: 597). 
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Figure 2  Analytical Levels of the KATO Project 
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       Collective Action, Sociological Analysis of Power. 
Figure 3: The Property Rights Process 
 
Source: Hanisch and Schlüter 1999
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